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Abstract
In this paper we study the response of vote shares to economic ﬂuctuations and conﬂict.
Spain seems to be the ideal niche for a case study like this since it has experienced both
phenomena during the last decades. Recent Spanish democratic history has witnessed four
complete economic cycles, with deep recessions and pronounced booms. During this period,
there has been a nationalistic conﬂict with terrorist manifestation. We use Spanish provincial
data from the ten congressional elections since the end of Franco’s dictatorship. Vote shares
at provincial level are modeled as fractional responses to unemployment, inﬂation, terrorism
assassinations, turnout and other factors. The statistical model used, a fractional probit, spec-
iﬁes conditional means of district and election unobserved effects as linear functions of the
covariates. Estimates of National Partial Effects (NPE), i.e. the effect on national vote shares
of changes in unemployment, inﬂation and terrorism are statistically signiﬁcant and quantita-
tively important. In addition, vote shares respond to participation rates and these also depend
on economic factors and terrorism, thus creating an endogeneity problem. The expected mar-
gin of victory is then used as instrument for turnout.
KEYWORDS: vote shares, turnout, fractional probit, partial effects, unemployment, terrorism.
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11 Introduction
The empirical evidence available indicates that electoral outcomes are related to economic condi-
tions. More speciﬁcally, economic downturns punish incumbents as they are held responsible for
economic adversity. For example, Fair (2009) ﬁnds that economic conditions affect U.S. presi-
dential and House elections, Lewis-Beck (1986) reports evidence in favor of this relationship for
Western European Countries and Pacek (1994) for East Central European countries.
Economic issues and electoral outcomes have been extensively analyzed in the political busi-
ness cycle models. Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) assume voters dislike inﬂation and
unemployment and they vote in favor of the incumbent (opposition) party if the economy expe-
riences low (high) inﬂation and unemployment. Therefore, according to this hypothesis, the vote
share of the incumbent party should be decreasing in past inﬂation and unemployment. Partisan
models, e.g. Hibbs (1977), assume that members of left-wing parties are more concerned with
unemployment and less concerned with inﬂation, whereas members of right-wing parties have op-
posite preferences. Voters have different preferences and vote for the right or left wing parties
accordingly. Under these assumptions, we should observe an increase in the right-wing vote share
after a period of high inﬂation and an increase in the left-wing vote share after a period of high
unemployment. For the U.S. presidential elections, Fox and Phillips (2003) ﬁndings appear to be
in line with the partisan models.
Terrorism has also been considered as another vote determinant. Berrebi and Klor (2006,
2008a) provide empirical evidence suggesting that terrorism affects electoral outcomes in Israel.
They ﬁnd that high terrorist activity in Israel increases right-wing support in subsequent elections.
The mechanism by which terrorism affects vote shares could be sketched as follows. If voters
dislike terrorism and they vote in favor of the incumbent party in case of an increase in terrorism
activity, we should observe a rise in the incumbent party’s vote share after a period of high terror-
ism activity. On the other hand, if voters dislike terrorism and identify a party as more likely to
implement strong anti-terrorism policies, we should observe an increase in that party’s vote share
after a period of high terrorism activity, despite whether that party was the incumbent or not.
In thispaperwestudytheresponseofvotesharestoeconomicﬂuctuationsand terroristconﬂict.
Spain seems to be the ideal niche for a study like this since it has experienced both phenomena
intensivelyduringthelastdecades. RecentSpanishdemocratichistoryhaswitnessedfourcomplete
economic cycles, with deep recessions and pronounced booms. During this period, there has been
a nationalistic conﬂict with terrorist manifestation. To give an idea of how important economic
conditions and terrorist activity are for Spaniards we rely on survey data from the Spanish Centro
de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS).1 Figure 1 shows the perception of the Spanish people about
1See Shambaugh and Josiger (2005) for the effect of terrorism on public opinion in the U.S.
2what are the most important problems in Spain during the last decade. Individuals surveyed are
asked to select within a list which are the three most important problems in Spain. Each colored
line in Figure 1 shows the percentage of people who selected a given problem as one of the three
most important. The main feature of these data is that unemployment and terrorism have been the
two most important issues in most surveys. Figure 1 also indicates that the importance of terrorism
appears to be decreasing, in parallel with the number of terrorist assassinations during this period.
In the case of Spain, the importance of terrorism in shaping people’s political preferences has
been the core of a hot debate. The March 11th terrorists attacks in Madrid took place three days
before general elections. Before the attacks, from January 24th to February 15th, CIS surveyed
24,109 people of which 42.2 per cent manifested they would vote for Partido Popular while 35.5
per cent would vote for Partido Socialista. Not surprisingly, many analysts argued that the terrorist
attacks favored Partido Socialista in winning the elections, e.g. van Biezen (2005) and Rose and
Murphy (2007). Garcia-Montalvo (2006) provided empirical evidence on the causal link between
the attacks and the election’s outcome. He pointed out that Spanish non residents voted before
the attacks took place and therefore could be used as a control group. This coincidence allowed
him to analyze a natural experiment by comparing vote shares of resident and non resident voters.
García-Montalvo results suggest that there is a causal effect of the March 11th terrorists attacks in
Madrid and the outcome of the election. Evidence in the same direction was also provided by Bali
(2007) who used survey data to establish the link between the attacks and the elections outcome.
Al-Qaeda March 11th attacks were the bloodiest terrorist attack in Spanish History, with 195
people murdered. However Al-Qaeda had never before committed an assassination in Spanish
soil. In addition to those assassinations, more than 800 terrorist assassinations were perpetrated in
Spain during the democratic period, most of which correspond to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).
Inference with a single case, like the Al-Qaeda attack, is problematic because, as pointed out by
Michavila(2005), the attacks might havehad no effect by themselvesif the unexpected vote for the
Partido Socialista was due to the dual news manipulationhypothesis. According to this hypothesis,
thegovernmentmanipulatedandhidfromvoterstheevidencethatAl-Qaedawasbehindtheattacks
while promoting that ETA was responsible. Therefore, in order to avoid this single case problems
weusethetemporaland spatial variationin all theotherterroristassassinationsto establishacausal
link between terrorism and vote shares.
In addition to economic conditions and terrorism, vote shares also depend on other factors.
One of these factors is turnout (see Pacek and Radcliff, 2003, van der Eijk and Egmond, 2007). A
high turnout rate might not affect all parties equally. Partisan voters should most likely vote for the
same party election after election while swing voters could change their vote from one election to
another. If the fraction of partisan voters is not equal among parties, then changes in turnout rate
should beneﬁt some parties and hurt others. When turnout is low, parties with a high fraction of
3partisan voters would not be hurt as much as parties with a low fraction of partisan voters.
A particularly important theme in the analysis of electoral data is the dynamics of turnout,
that is, the way participation changes from one election to another. On the one hand, vote shares
respond to participation rates as argued above. On the other hand, turnout itself may also depend
on economicfactors and terrorism. Forinstance, Blais (2000)argues thata risein terrorism activity
might increase turnout by inducing voters to feel more obliged to fulﬁll their civil duties. Turnout
also responds to economic downturns as documented by Aguilar and Pacek (2000) who argue that
macroeconomic downturns may increase voter participation as more lower status voters express
their grievances at the polls. Turnout’s response to economic factors and terrorism creates an
endogeneity problem. The strategy used for identiﬁcation is inspired by the model of Feddersen
and Sandroni (2006), which predicts that turnout should be decreasing in the margin of victory,
and the experimental evidence of Klor and Winter (2008), which suggests that turnout is high
when electoral outcomes are expected to be close. Using the expected margin of victory as an
instrument, we are able to circumvent the problem of endogeneity of turnout.
In this paper we use a fractional probit model to estimate vote shares equations using a panel
of the ﬁfty Spanish provinces (constituencies) during the ten general elections held after Franco’s
dictatorship. The fractional probit model takes into account the bounded nature of vote shares and
speciﬁes the conditional mean of vote shares as a nonlinear function of unemployment, inﬂation,
terrorism, turnout and unobserved provincial and election effects. Instead of taking the unobserved
effects as ﬁxed, we follow Mundlak (1976) in specifying conditional means of district and election
unobserved effects as linear functions of covariates. The estimated model is used to compute the
partial effects of changes in the explanatory variables on vote shares at the provincial level. Unlike
the linear model that constrains partial effects across provinces to be equal, the fractional probit
model allows for province and election speciﬁc partial effects. These partial effects are aggregated
at the national level to obtain the National Partial Effects (NPE), that is the effect on national vote
shares of changes in covariates.
A by side contribution of this paper is methodological. To the best of my knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst paper that considers vote shares as fractional responses. The most frequently used method
assumes vote shares are a linear function of covariates. This assumption misspeciﬁes the condi-
tional mean simply because predicted vote shares could lay outside the unit interval. Because vote
shares are bounded, their conditional mean must be a nonlinear function of covariates. However,
modeling vote shares as a linear function of covariates could be a reasonable approximation if vote
shares cluster together. For instance, in a biparty democracy, with vote shares close to 0.5, the
conditional mean of vote shares could be approximately linear.2 As a vote share approaches either
2Fair (2009) notices that U.S. national vote shares range from 0.35 to 0.65 and therefore their conditional mean
should be approximately linear.
4zero or unity its response to a change in covariates is likely to be different from the response when
vote shares are near 0.5, where the linear relationship is more likely to hold. When the number of
parties is greater than two, and therefore vote shares need not cluster together near 0.5, the linear
approximation could be worse. In addition, when using panel data at the district level, even in
a biparty system, vote shares for a party could vary a lot from one district to another, and more
so with more than two parties. Arguably, this argument could be important in our application to
Spanish provinces (constituencies) where, in addition to the national parties, regional parties run
for general elections and obtain signiﬁcant vote shares in about half the constituencies.
Anotherapproachusedintheliteraturetoestimatevoteshareequationsassumestheconditional
mean of the log odds ratio is linear in the covariates. This procedure does not misspecify the
conditional mean but introduces a problem in the estimation of partial effects. Computing the
partial effect of a covariate on the conditional mean of vote shares requires numerical integration.
Although computationally demanding this procedure is feasible, but as far as I know no one has
taken this route.
For comparison purposes, we present results of the fractional probit and the linear model.
This comparison allows us to assess the gain obtained from a proper treatment of vote shares as
fractional responses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the fractional response model
under the assumption that all covariates, including turnout, are strictly exogenous. Section 3 ex-
tends the analysis to the more realistic case when turnout is endogenous. Section 4 describes de
data used and reports the empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 A fractional Probit model for vote shares
Let t = 1,....,T index elections, j = 1,.......,J electoral districts and i = 1,....,I political parties.
Let sijt be the vote share of party i in district j in electiont. For most of the analysis the party index
i will not be necessary, so we drop it. Vote shares, as other proportions, are classiﬁed as fractional
response variables. Statistically speaking, fractional response variables are very common. This
is the case of market shares, exam pass rates, regulation compliance rates, etc. Vote shares are
bounded, 0 ≤ sjt ≤ 1, and therefore cannot be modeled as a linear function of the covariates. To
see why this cannot be the case, assume that the conditional mean of vote shares is linear in the
covariates, that is,
E(sjt | Xjt) = QXjt (1)
where Xjt is K×1 vector of strictly exogenous covariates and Q is a row vector of parameters. Ei-
ther we restrict the range of the linear index QXjt or the conditional mean can lay outside the unit
5interval. Most of the empirical evidence on vote shares determinants, however, use this misspeci-
ﬁed conditional mean. Some of the empirical evidence available assumes the log-odds conditional











This speciﬁcation implies that vote shares conditional mean is
E(sjt | Xjt,ujt) =
eQXjt+ujt
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. Therefore, recovering the conditional mean of vote
shares requires computing the following integral
E(sjt | Xjt) =
Z eQXjt+z
1+eQXjt+z f(z)dz, (4)
where f( )istheprobabilitydensityfunctionofu. Thisintegralcanbecomputednumericallyusing
an estimate of the density function. In practice, researchers running log odds ratio regressions do
not compute the previous integral. To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever estimated this
conditional mean numerically.
In this paper we assume that vote shares conditional mean is a nonlinear function of an index
of covariates





where F( ) : R →[0,1] is a continuous and increasing function of a linear index of covariates. Two
statistical procedures have been developed to analyze this type of data: the fractional logit and pro-
bit models. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) used the fractional logit model to analyze pension plans
participation rates. Other applications of this procedure include Hausman and Leonard (1997),
Liu, Liu, Hammitt and Chou (1999) and Warner (2003). Papke and Wooldridge (2008) argue that
for the case of a panel data, as in our application, the fractional probit is better suited, and this is
the procedure used in this paper. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the conditional mean of vote
shares are linked to an index of observables and nonobservables as
E(sjt | aj,bt,pjt,Xjt) = F
￿
aj +bt +apjt +QXjt
￿
, (6)
where F( ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, aj and bt are district and elec-
tion speciﬁc unobserved effects, pjt is the turnout rate in district j and election t, Xjt is K ×1
vector of strictly exogenous covariates, a is a scalar parameter and the Q is a row vector of pa-
6rameters. These strictly exogenous covariates include macroeconomic indicators (unemployment
and inﬂation) a measure of conﬂict (terrorism assassinations), demographic variables (population
density), political considerations (turnout) and other controls (dummy variables for landlock and
vernacular language). Some of these covariates, the unemploymentand turnout rates, are fractions.
In those cases, the corresponding element of Xjt, say xkjt, will enter the conditional mean trans-
formed so that xkjt = F−1(hkjt) where hkjt is the original fraction. This transformation is such that
the covariates range is the real line.3
District and election speciﬁc unobserved effects are modeled à la Mundlak (1978). Thus, we
assume that the conditional mean of unobservable district speciﬁc effects, aj, is linear in the mean
value of the covariates
aj = GX j +uaj (7)
where G is a vector of parameters, X j = (1/T)å
T
t=1Xjt and uaj = aj −E(aj | Xj1,...,XjT). This
assumption amounts to saying that unobserved district speciﬁc effects are correlated with observ-
able covariates. The time average of covariates can be interpreted as a measure of how important
unemployment, inﬂation and terrorism have been for a speciﬁc province during the sample period.
In other words a high time average of, say unemployment, for province j indicates a high degree
of persistence of unemployment in that province. Therefore, equation (7) captures the inﬂuence
of persistence in unemployment on the provincial unobserved effect. If unemployment favors a
given party, and a province has experienced high levels of unemployment, that party vote share
will exhibit a high value of the provincial unobserved effect.
In sharp contrast to most panel data analysis, where typically unobserved time effects are
treated as ﬁxed, we allow unobserved election speciﬁc effects to be a function of the covariates,
that is
bt = LXt +ubt
where L is a vector of parameters, Xt = å
J
j=1gjtXjt is a weighted average of the vector of covari-
ates and ubt = bt −E(bt | Xj1,...,XjT). These weighted averages are national wide values of the
covariates. The analysis of vote shares suggests that national wide shocks and trends may affect
provincial level outcomes. For instance, if the unemployment rate is very high at the national level,
this may lower incumbent’s vote shares in provinces where unemployment is not particularly high.
Similarly, a high level of terrorism at the national level may affect vote shares at the provincial
level, even in provinces where terrorism has no particular incidence. Notice that the national level
of, say, unemployment is not the average of provincial level unemployment rates but a weighted
average of provincial unemployment rates. For other variables, such as the number of terrorism
3For example, suppose we want to explain y using a single covariate m and both variables are fractions, then the
relationship we postulate is of the form G(y) = a+bG(m)+u with u ∼ N(0,s2
u) and G( ) = F−1( ). Therefore,
y = F(a+bG(x)+u) and E(y | G(x)) = F(au+buG(x)) where au = a/
p
1+s2




7assassinations, the national value is the sum of the provincial ﬁgures. In the latter case, all weights
would be equal to one.
We can write vote shares conditional mean as
E(sjt | pjt,Xjt,uaj,ubt) = F
￿
GX j +LXt +apjt +QXjt +uaj +ubt
￿
(8)
Further assuming that uaj ∽ N(0,s2
a) and ubt ∽ N(0,s2
b) and making use of the mixing properties
of the normal distribution we can write
E(sjt | pjt,Xjt) = F
￿
GuX j +LuXt +aupjt +QuXjt
￿
, (9)





According to Mundlak’s hypothesis vote shares conditional mean is a function of the time
average of covariates, X j, and the average across individuals, Xt. The time average is a dis-
trict speciﬁc effect that, depending on its magnitude, can inﬂict a substantial persistence in vote
shares.4 The average across provinces is an election speciﬁc effect indicating how national aggre-
gate unemployment, inﬂation and terrorism affect vote shares at the provincial level. Gélineau and
Bélanger (2005) ﬁnd that incumbent provincial vote shares are affected by national unemployment
in Canada.
3 Endogenous turnout
It can be argued that the turnout rate is not a strictly exogenous covariate. There are at least two
reasons why this might be case. First, Aguilar and Pacek (2000) provide evidence indicating that
macroeconomic downturns may increase voter participation as more lower status voters express
theirgrievancesat thepolls. Second, Blais (2000)suggeststhat arise interrorism activityincreases
turnout by creating a sense of civil duty on voters.5
In addition to macroeconomic factors and terrorism, it has also been claimed that turnout also
depends on other variables that do not affect vote shares. For instance, the models of Feddersen
and Sandroni (2006) and Li and Majumdar (forthcoming) and the laboratory evidence of Klor and
Winter (2008) suggest that turnout should be decreasing in the expected margin of victory. That is,
close electoral races are followed by high turnout. In addition to the expected margin of victory,
other turnout determinants include some calendar effects. In particular, Mattila (2003) reported
evidence indicating that the following indicators were signiﬁcant determinants of turnout in other
electoral races: dummy variables indicating (i) whether the election took place on a weekend or
4Dolado, Gonzalo y Mayoral (2002) ﬁnd that opinion polls in Spain exhibit a high degree of persistence.
5Degan and Merlo (2007) argue that civil duty is a determinant of turnout.
8not, (ii) whether the election was the ﬁrst general election and (iii) whether there were concurrent
elections.
Notice that the source of endogeneity here is different from that considered by Papke and
Wooldridge (2008). They consider a regressor that is correlated with time varying unobserved
effects. In ourcase, theendogenousregressor, turnout, is correlated with otherobservedcovariates.
Assume the turnout conditional mean depends on the vector of covariates Xjt (unemployment,
inﬂation, terrorist assassinations) and also on other covariates included in a H ×1 vector Zjt (ex-
pected margin of victory and other calendar effects). Stacking Xjt and Zjt into a (K+H)×1 vector
Wjt we write
E(pjt | cj,dt,Wjt) = cj +dt +PpWjt, (10)
where cj and dt are provincial and election speciﬁc unobserved effects and Pp is vector of param-
eters. As before, the conditional mean of provincial and election unobserved effects are assumed
to be functions of the covariates
cj =CpW j +ucj,
dt = DpWt +udj,
where ucj = cj −E(cj |Wj1,...,WjT) and udj = dj −E(dj |Wj1,...,WjT). Therefore, we can write
turnout as
pjt =CpW j +DpWt +PpWjt +vjt,
where vjt is the unexpected turnout.
Under these assumptions the conditional mean of vote shares is
E(sjt |Wjt,vjt) = F(CW j +DWt +PWjt +auvjt) (11)
whichisareducedformequationforvoteshareswhereC=(Gu+auCx,auCz), D=(Lu+auDx,auDz),
P = (Qu+auPx,auPz),Cp = (Cx,Cz), Dp = (Dx,Dz) and Pp = (Px,Pw). This reduced equation
has two interesting features. First, the coefﬁcient on vjt is in fact an structural parameter: vote
shares sensitivity to turnout in equation (9). Second, the relationship between the reduced form
parameters and the structural ones could be used to get estimates of the structural parameters via
classical minimum distance estimators.
Equation (11) can be estimated by the Pooled Fractional Probit (PFP) estimator (or Bernoulli
quasi-MLE), see Papke and Wooldridge (2008). An asymptotically equivalent estimator is easy to
obtain using the generalized estimating equation, xtgee command in STATA.
The estimation procedure has two steps: (i) ﬁrst estimate ˆ vjt from a pooled regression of pjt on
on W j, Wt and Wjt, (ii) second, estimateC, D, P and au from a Pooled Fractional Probit of sjt on
9W j, Wt, Wjt and ˆ vjt. Because we are using a two-step estimation procedure, standard errors must
be corrected for the ﬁrst stage estimation. In our application we use bootstrapped standard errors.
Parameter estimatestogetherwith theirstandard errors can beused to drawinference on causal-
ity from covariates to vote shares. However, quantitative assessment of the effect of covariates on
vote shares requires additional calculations. The partial effect of a change in the k-th (continuous)
covariate on the expected vote shares is
¶E(sjt |Wjt,vjt)
¶wkjt
= f(CW j +DWt +PWjt +auvjt)pk (12)
where wkjt is one of the elements ofWjt, f( ) is the standard normal density function and pk is the
k-th element of P. Notice that for those covariates that are fractions, the partial effect should be
multiplied by
dF−1(z)
d(z) .6 Thus coefﬁcients indicate the direction of the partial effects but not their
magnitude. The Fractional Probit model allows for province and election speciﬁc partial effects,
that is, the effect of a given covariate on vote shares depends on which province and election is
considered. Thisheterogeneityofpartial effectsis an advantageoftheFractional Probitmodelover
the standard linear model, which predicts the same partial effect across provinces and elections.
Since partial effects have a geographical consideration, it is therefore feasible to display partial
effects in a map.
Oftentimes, the J ×T partial effects like (12) are averaged out to obtain the average partial
effect (APE). In our analysis of vote shares we are interested in the partial effect of covariates on
national vote shares. Vote shares at the national level are a weighted sum of the provincial vote
shares st = å
J
j=1ljtsjt, where ljt = Vjt/Vt is the share of valid votes in province j at election t.
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ljtf(CW j +DWt +PWjt +auvjt)pk.
We will refer to this quantity as the National Partial Effect (NPE).





























f(CW j +DWt +PWjt +auvjt)
we can compare them with the linear model estimates.
Goodness of ﬁt comparison of the linear and fractional probit models is problematic. The
linear model R2 measure is not available for the the fractional probit model. For goodness of ﬁt







and ˆ sjt are observed and predicted vote shares. Notice that the traditional chi-squared goodness
of ﬁt measure uses the model predicted values in the denominator, but then negative vote shares
predictions generated by the linear modelwould contributeto reducing the valueof thechi-squared
measure. To avoid this inconvenience, we use the observed vote shares which are always positive
in the denominator.
4 The data and empirical results
Table 1 summarizes national vote shares and turnout in the ten Spanish general elections after
Franco’s dictatorship. The third general election in 1982 led to an abrupt fall in the vote share of
the ruling party Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) and winner of the ﬁrst two general elections.
In subsequent elections, UCD vote share fell to less than one per cent vote shares after the 1996
election. This irregular party behavior induced us to exclude it from the analysis hereinafter. Thus,
we focus the analysis in the three national parties, Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE),
Partido Popular (PP) and Izquierda Unida (IU).7 The fall in UCD vote share was accompanied by
a rise in PSOE and PP vote shares. Table 1 also indicates that turnout rate ranges from a low 68
per cent in 1979 to a maximum of 80 per cent in 1993. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on
vote shares and the explanatory variables at the national and provincial levels. Partido Socialista
exhibits the highest average vote share at both national and provincial levels. Partido Popular
scores the second at national and provincial levels and exhibits the highest variability of vote
shares. Notice that the expected margin of victory from polls is only available in 373 cases, none
of which correspond to the ﬁrst two elections. Therefore, all the analysis is restricted to 373
observations corresponding to the last eight elections.
Tables 3 reports the turnout equation estimates. According to these estimates, domestic terror-
ism affects turnout positively and signiﬁcantly at the provincial and national levels. Unemploy-
ment, however, has a positive effect on turnout at the provincial level and a negative and larger
7Up to the 1989 elections, IU vote shares are those of the Partido Comunista.
11effect at the national level. When the provincial and national ﬁgures affect turnout in different di-
rections, the reading of the estimates should be as follows. National unemployment lowers turnout
in all provinces, but not that much in provinces where unemployment is particularly high. In-
ﬂation does not appear to affect turnout in a signiﬁcant way. The expected margin of victory
affects turnout negatively, that is, the closer the expected margin of victory, the higher turnout.
The province speciﬁc unemployment time mean affects turnout negatively meaning that turnout is
higher in provinces with lower level of unemployment.
Table 4 reports the Pooled Fractional Probit estimates of model (11) for PSOE, PP and IU.
Columns (1), (4) and (7) report parameter estimates and columns (2), (5) and (8) t-stats. Un-
employment at the provincial level does not have a signiﬁcant effect on any party, but national
unemployment lowers PSOE vote share and increases IU’s. Provincial inﬂation has a positive ef-
fect on PSOE vote share and a negative one on PP vote share. National inﬂation lowers IU vote
share. Domestic terrorism affects PSOE vote share negatively at the provincial level. National
aggregate ﬁgures of domestic terrorism lower PP’s vote share and increase IU’s. When terrorism
has an international origin, it affects positively PSOE and negatively PP and IU. When the ex-
pected margin of victory at the national level is large, all parties vote shares decrease, but less so in
provinces with large expected margin of victory. The chi-squared goodness of ﬁt statistics indicate
that the fractional probit model ﬁts better the PSOE and IU vote shares data than the PP ones.
Table 5 reports the linear model estimates. With only a few exceptions, coefﬁcient estimates
have the same sing than the fractional probit estimates. A formal comparison of the linear model
estimates and the fractional probit marginal effects (columns (3), (6) and (9) in Table 4) indicates
that their order of magnitudeis similar. There seems to be no bias in either direction as 22 of the 42
cases where a comparison in feasible the linear model estimate is larger than the fractional probit
estimate. However, differences in parameter estimates are sometimes relatively sizable. Statistical
signiﬁcance of parameters would be almost the same with the linear or the fractional probit model
except for IU. Comparing the chi-squared goodness of ﬁt statistics in Tables 3 and 4, the fractional
probit model ﬁts better vote shares data for all three parties. The fractional probit outperforms the
linear model in terms of goodness of ﬁt, particularly in the case of IU.
Tables 6 and 7 report the fractional probit and linear model estimates this time including in-
teractions with an incumbency dummy variable. These models allow for a differential effect of
covariates when the party under consideration is the incumbent or not. Since IU has never been the
incumbentparty, theanalysis is restricted to PSOE and PP. Comparingthe goodnessof ﬁt measures
of this models and those of Table 4, the ﬁt is now better. Interactions with party speciﬁc incum-
bency dummy appear to be signiﬁcant for PSOE, both at the provincial and national levels, and
only at the national level for PP. Comparing the fractional probit estimates with the linear model
estimates of Table 7, we can see that the results are similar. While the fractional probit model ﬁts
12better PP vote shares data, the linear model outperforms the fractional probit model in terms of
goodness of ﬁt for PSOE.
The quantitative effect of covariates on vote shares depends on the scale of measurement of
covariates. In order to compare the quantitative effect on vote shares of changes in different co-
variates we rely on standardized parameter estimates. We multiply parameter estimates by the
standard deviation of the corresponding covariate and report the results in Table 8. Standardized
coefﬁcient estimates for PSOE indicate that the incidence of terrorism on a particular province has
an effect quantitatively smaller than inﬂation and larger than unemployment. National aggregate
terrorism ﬁgures have a larger impact (in absolute value) than national inﬂation but smaller than
national unemployment.
The fractional probit model generates heterogeneous provincial partial effects. This is illus-
trated in Figure 2 which plots provincial partial effects of national terrorism on PSOE vote shares
in a map of Spanish provinces for the 2008 general election. Alternatively, provincial partial ef-
fects can be aggregated into national partial effects and plotted against the election year. Figure 3
shows the partial effect of national terrorism on the national vote share for PSOE (the NPE) for all
elections after 1982. The NPE of national terrorism changes from negative when PSOE was in the
opposition to positive when it was the incumbent.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of economic factors and terrorism as vote share determinants using
Spanish general elections as the benchmark. This paper contributes the following results. First,
previous empirical evidence has found economic factors and terrorism signiﬁcant vote share de-
terminants. However, this evidence has looked at either economic factors or terrorism at a time.
We include them together and are able to compare their relative magnitude. We ﬁnd that unem-
ployment, inﬂation and terrorism activity have a statistically signiﬁcant and quantitatively sizable
impact on vote shares. Second, allowing province and election speciﬁc unobserved effects to de-
pend on covariateslinearly, weare ableto asses theeffect ofnationalaggregatesof macroeconomic
magnitudes and terrorism activity on vote shares. We ﬁnd that national aggregates have a much
larger effect on provincial vote shares than the particular incidence of covariates at the provincial
level. Third, this is the ﬁrst attempt to use the Fractional Probit model for panel data vote share
data analysis. The model allows for district speciﬁc partial effects which are constrained to be
constant in the linear model. The fractional probit ﬁts the data better than the linear model in 4




Data on Spanish general elections at the municipal, provincial and national levels were collected
fromtheSpanishMinistryofInteriorwebpagehttp://www.elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp/resultados/index.htm
Data on the number of people murdered by terrorist acts comes from Asociación de Victimas
del Terrorismo (AVT). http://www.avt.org/victimasdelterrorismo.php
Data on inﬂation and unemployment was downloaded from Instituto Nacional de Estadística
(INE) web site http://www.ine.es
People’s opinion pools before elections are from CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas).
Variable deﬁnition
Unemployment: fraction of the labor force unemployed measured at the month previous to the
election.
Inﬂation: inﬂation rate in percentage during the year before the election.
Domestict terrorism: number of assassinations by domestic terrorist organizations between elec-
tions.
International terrorism: number of assassinations by international terrorist organizations between
elections.
Population density: million of inhabitants per squared kilometer
Coastline: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the province has coastline.
Vernacular language: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the province has a vernacular
language.
Turnout: fraction of valid votes over the census.
vote share: fraction of valid votes to a party over total valid votes.
Expected margin of victory: difference between the vote shares of the highest and second high
vote share intentions.
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17Table 1: Vote shares and Turnout in Spanish General Elections at the National level
Days between
Date PSOE PP IU UCD+CDS Turnout elections
June 15, 1977 0.29 0.08 0.09 0.34 0.79 -
March 1, 1979 0.30 0.06 0.11 0.35 0.68 616
October 28, 1982 0.48 0.26 0.04 0.10 0.76 1317
June 22, 1986 0.44 0.26 0.05 0.09 0.74 1314
October 29, 1989 0.40 0.26 0.09 0.08 0.69 1207
June 6, 1993 0.39 0.35 0.10 0.02 0.80 1297
March 3, 1996 0.38 0.39 0.11 0.00 0.76 987
March 13, 2000 0.34 0.45 0.05 0.00 0.70 1450
March 14, 2004 0.43 0.38 0.05 0.00 0.70 1441
March 9, 2008 0.44 0.40 0.04 - 0.77 1435
PSOE = Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PP = Partido Popular, IU = Izquierda Unida,
UCD = Unión de Centro Democrático, CDS = Centro Democrático y Social.
18Table 2: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Panel A: National level
Vote share PSOE 10 0.3890 0.0618 0.2915 0.4824
Vote share PP 10 0.2884 0.1312 0.0605 0.4452
Vote share IU 10 0.0721 0.0287 0.0377 0.1077
Turnout 10 0.7389 0.0437 0.6809 0.7988
Unemployment 10 0.1431 0.0630 0.0472 0.2265
Inﬂation 10 0.0702 0.0445 0.0240 0.1530
Domestic terrorism 10 83.7 65.0 5 223
International terrorism 10 19.5 61.7 0 195
Expected margin of victory 10 0.0877 0.0698 0.0116 0.2181
Population Density 10 79.374 5.3802 74.790 91.466
Panel B: Provincial level
Vote share PSOE 500 0.3792 0.1002 0.1239 0.6376
Vote share PP 496 0.3140 0.1614 0.0299 0.6531
Vote share IU 497 0.0578 0.0373 0.0069 0.1986
Turnout 500 0.7412 0.0672 0.4438 0.8761
Unemployment 500 0.1331 0.0790 0.0036 0.4139
Inﬂation 500 0.0688 0.0444 0.0120 0.2000
Domestic terrorism 500 2.0640 11.796 0 201
International terrorism 500 0.3900 8.7207 0 195
Expected margin of victory 373 0.1401 0.1084 0.0009 0.5390
Population Density 500 111.38 143.55 8.8237 781.80
Coastline 500 0.44 0.4969 0 1
Vernacular language 500 0.32 0.4669 0 1






Domestic Terrorism 0.0015 3.78
International Terrorism 0.0002 0.87
Expected Margin of Victory -0.0109 -1.14
Population density 0.0001 0.92
Coastline -0.0127 -3.09




Domestic Terrorism 0.0019 9.26
International Terrorism -0.0001 -0.67




Domestic Terrorism -0.0047 -1.75
R2 = 0.5652
Robust t-stat with clustering on provinces
20Table 4: Fractional Probit Estimates of Vote share equations
PSOE PP IU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Estimate t-stat Margin Estimate t-stat Margin Estimate t-stat Margin
Constant -0.6270 -1.03 -0.1804 -0.20 -1.9201 -3.82
Provincial variables
Unemployment -0.0044 -0.08 -0.0016 0.0212 0.36 0.0078 0.0132 0.13 0.0014
Inﬂation 0.0198 2.70 0.0076 -0.0184 -2.82 -0.0067 0.0050 0.46 0.0005
Domestic Terrorism -0.0022 -2.75 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.53 -0.0003 -0.0051 -1.49 -0.0005
International Terrorism 0.0007 7.20 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.81 -0.0001 -0.0007 -2.27 -0.0001
Expected Margin of victory 0.0243 2.17 0.0093 -0.0105 -0.82 -0.0039 0.0342 2.45 0.0036
Unexpected turnout 0.2669 2.80 0.1018 -0.0864 -0.65 -0.0316 0.1741 1.19 0.0186
Population density -0.0001 -0.52 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.16 -0.0000 0.0004 1.15 0.0000
Coastline -0.0340 -0.73 -0.0290 -0.31 -0.0733 -0.89
Vernacular language -0.0796 -1.68 -0.2323 -1.75 -0.1389 -1.44
National aggregates
Unemployment -0.2337 -4.18 -0.0892 -0.0777 -1.19 -0.0284 0.2267 2.21 0.0241
Inﬂation -0.0047 -0.42 -0.0018 0.0152 1.52 0.0055 -0.0930 -5.88 -0.0099
Domestic Terrorism 0.0005 1.60 0.0002 -0.0017 -5.46 -0.0006 0.0036 11.33 0.0039
International Terrorism 0.0003 3.19 0.0001 -0.0003 -3.75 -0.0001 -0.0013 -10.73 -0.0001
Expected Margin of victory -0.0349 -2.81 -0.0133 -0.1279 -10.46 -0.0468 -0.1559 -7.88 -0.0166
Time Means
Unemployment 0.4963 4.63 -0.3353 -1.52 0.4931 2.98
Inﬂation 0.0010 1.21 -0.0007 -0.55 0.0018 2.58
Domestic Terrorism -0.0099 -1.06 -0.0184 -1.10 0.0032 0.18
Chi-square goodness of ﬁt 3.1677 13.5726 3.6063
Number of observations=373. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications.
2
1Table 5: Linear Model Estimates of Vote Share Equations
PSOE PP IU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant 0.2582 1.18 0.3154 1.13 0.0068 0.14
Provincial variables
Unemployment 0.0131 0.51 0.0332 1.08 0.0018 0.16
Inﬂation 0.0082 2.21 -0.0138 -2.58 0.0001 0.04
Domestic Terrorism -0.0009 -4.52 0.0005 1.87 -0.0003 -2.05
International Terrorism 0.0005 2.85 0.0005 1.27 -0.0000 -0.06
Expected Margin of victory 0.0064 1.15 0.0043 0.62 0.0014 0.87
Unexpected turnout 0.1058 3.17 0.0902 0.96 0.0343 2.79
Population density -0.0000 -0.72 -0.0000 -0.02 0.0000 1.62
Coastline -0.0169 -1.02 -0.0078 -0.26 -0.0081 -1.01
Vernacular language -0.0267 -1.61 -0.0752 -1.92 -0.0114 -1.32
National aggregates
Unemployment -0.1022 -3.58 -0.0469 -1.26 0.0156 1.44
Inﬂation -0.0032 -0.63 0.0165 2.41 -0.0101 -5.07
Domestic Terrorism 0.0002 1.73 -0.0008 -5.19 0.0004 8.39
International Terrorism 0.0001 2.44 -0.0001 -2.54 -0.0002 -9.64
Expected Margin of victory -0.0114 -1.83 -0.0495 -6.41 -0.0224 -8.83
Time Means
Unemployment 0.1847 4.24 -0.1754 -2.85 0.0549 2.98
Inﬂation 0.0004 1.28 -0.0002 -0.48 0.0002 2.75
Domestic Terrorism -0.0036 -3.77 -0.0065 -3.54 0.0000 0.09
Chi-square goodness of ﬁt 3.1847 13.7604 4.0668
R2 0.6148 0.4874 0.5673
Number of observations=373. Robust t-statistic with clustering on provinces.
22Table 6: FP Estimates of Vote share equations with interactions
PSOE PP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimate t-stat Margin Estimate t-stat Margin
Constant -2.7094 -3.75 -0.5496 -0.55
Provincial variables
Unemployment 0.0692 1.73 0.0264 -0.0273 -0.50 -0.0100
Unemployment×Incumbent -0.0805 -2.72 -0.0306 0.0750 1.85 0.0274
Inﬂation 0.0241 2.50 0.0092 -0.0090 -1.37 -0.0033
Inﬂation×Incumbent -0.0135 -1.23 -0.0052 -0.0090 -0.45 -0.0033
Domestic Terrorism -0.0015 -0.59 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.10 -0.0000
Domestic Terrorism×Incumbent -0.0040 -1.63 -0.0015 0.0056 0.39 0.0020
International Terrorism 0.0007 7.09 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.99 -0.0002
Expected Margin of Victory 0.0280 3.26 0.0107 -0.0054 -0.64 -0.0020
Population density -0.0002 -0.92 -0.0001 0.0003 0.71 0.0001
Unexpected turnout 0.1803 1.82 0.0687 -0.0266 -0.24 -0.0097
Coastline -0.0294 -0.60 -0.0421 -0.47
Vernacular language -0.0810 -1.65 -0.2859 -2.30
National aggregates
Unemployment -1.4567 -7.62 -0.5552 -0.2221 -3.44 -0.0811
Unemployment×Incumbent 0.5315 9.04 0.2026 0.6859 10.40 0.2505
Inﬂation 0.1698 3.13 0.0647 -0.0099 -1.18 -0.0036
Inﬂation×Incumbent -0.0153 -0.45 -0.0058 0.3698 11.89 0.1350
Domestic Terrorism -0.0075 -3.03 -0.0029 0.0001 0.42 0.0000
Domestic Terrorism×Incumbent 0.0105 3.47 0.0040
Expected Margin of Victory -0.5502 -5.94 -0.2097 -0.2366 -17.31 -0.0864
Time Means
Unemployment 0.4704 4.51 -0.2586 -1.21
Inﬂation 0.0009 1.15 -0.0006 -0.42
Domestic Terrorism -0.0068 -0.63 -0.0191 -1.66
Chi-squared gooodness of ﬁt 2.6490 12.1739
Number of observations=373. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications.
23Table 7: Linear Model with interactions
PSOE PP
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant -0.6052 -2.25 0.1834 0.66
Provincial variables
Unemployment 0.0423 2.02 -0.0009 -0.03
Unemployment×Incumbent -0.0309 -2.26 0.0450 1.19
Inﬂation 0.0087 1.75 -0.0102 -1.99
Inﬂation×Incumbent -0.0020 -0.32 -0.0156 -0.66
Domestic Terrorism -0.0008 -4.0 0.0004 1.27
Domestic Terrorism×Incumbent -0.0011 -3.91 -0.0073 -1.25
International Terrorism 0.0005 2.64 0.0007 1.59
Expected Margin of Victory 0.0073 1.56 0.0083 1.19
Population density -0.0000 -0.63 0.0000 0.01
Unexpected turnout 0.1012 3.01 0.1834 0.66
Coastline -0.0181 -1.09 -0.0072 -0.24
Vernacular language -0.0290 -1.75 -0.0745 -1.91
National aggregates
Unemployment -0.5934 -7.30 -0.0868 -2.20
Unemployment×Incumbent 0.2070 8.02 0.2454 4.01
Inﬂation 0.0734 3.10 0.0064 0.96
Inﬂation×Incumbent -0.0152 -0.98 0.1545 4.54
Domestic Terrorism -0.0032 -2.98 -0.0001 -0.85
Domestic Terrorism×Incumbent 0.0045 3.38
Expected Margin of Victory 0.0073 1.56 -0.0883 -10.24
Time Means
Unemployment 0.1702 4.16 -0.1546 -2.58
Inﬂation 0.0004 1.25 -0.0002 -0.43
Domestic Terrorism -0.0031 -3.22 -0.0059 -2.86
R2 0.6773 0.5382
Chi-squared gooodness of ﬁt 2.6113 12.5412
Number of observations=373.
Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications.
24Table 8: Standardized PSOE Fractional Probit Estimates
Std. dev. Parameter Standardized
Covariate Estimate Estimate
Provincial variables
Unemployment 0.3311 -0.0044 -0.0015
Inﬂation 3.4436 0.0198 0.0682
Domestic Terrorism 8.2366 -0.0022 -0.0181
International Terrorism 10.0967 0.0007 0.0071
Expected Margin of victory 0.6033 0.0243 0.0147
Unexpected turnout 0.1221 0.2669 0.0326
National aggregates
Unemployment 0.2093 -0.2337 -0.0489
Inﬂation 3.3678 -0.0047 -0.0158
Domestic Terrorism 70.0808 0.0005 0.0350
International Terrorism 66.5266 0.0003 0.0200
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Figure 3: PSOE National partial effect of domestic terrorism at the national level.
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